Source: www.forum18.org
Date: October 3, 2024
https://www.forum18.org/archiv
By Victoria Arnold, Forum 18
Russia's ever-increasing internet censorship continues to affect the
exercise of freedom of religion and belief in the country. The censorship
denies local people freedom of expression in various matters related to
religion and the opportunity freely to seek information and views on
religious issues. It also has a chilling effect on those considering
publishing their views on issues related to religion which the regime
dislikes.
Communications regulator Roskomnadzor blocks access to websites, demands
that even foreign sites remove information deemed to threaten state
security or public order in Russia, monitors (with the security services)
the use of social media, and is exploring the use of artificial
intelligence to make all these processes more efficient (see below).
Websites may be blocked specifically for their religious content, if this
is associated with material or religious organisations which courts have
already outlawed as "extremist", as in the case of Jehovah's Witnesses'
sites and even Wikipedia pages about them. This also includes LGBT+ related
religious sites (see forthcoming F18News article).
The majority of religious sites, however, have become subject to "military"
censorship since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,
with any opposition to the war being taken as grounds for preventing
access. Similarly, several individuals who have been prosecuted for
protesting against the war in religious terms or from a religious
perspective have found their social media profiles blocked by order of
Roskomnadzor (see forthcoming F18News article).
Roskomnadzor has also blocked a large number of websites of media outlets,
civil society organisations, and human rights groups which have reported on
violations of freedom of religion and belief. While their coverage of such
issues is not typically the reason for the blocking, restricting access to
their work on religious freedom further reduces the space for discussion of
the topic inside Russia (see forthcoming F18News article).
Beyond their immediate impact, the concrete measures state agencies take to
restrict access to online information also has a chilling effect on freedom
of expression in general, with Freedom House noting in its 2023 report on
Russia an increase in self-censorship when writing about "controversial"
topics (see below).
While there is no explicit ban on sharing links to or quoting material from
blocked websites, doing so may still incur penalties, depending on the
reason a site was blocked. If a publication or internet user quotes from
the blocked site of an "undesirable organisation", they may be prosecuted
for "participation in the activities of an undesirable organisation".
Linking to a site belonging to an "extremist organisation", or citing its
materials, could lead to administrative or even criminal prosecution under
the Extremism Law (see below).
The majority of religious websites now inaccessible in Russia (without a
VPN) appear to have been blocked "openly" – that is, Roskomnadzor has
added them to the publicly searchable registry of sites which Russian
internet providers are obliged to prevent their customers from seeing (see
below).
A few, however, are not in the registry, yet still appear to be
inaccessible to some or all internet users inside Russia. It is unclear why
this might be – it is possible that such sites have fallen victim to the
filtering of internet traffic through Roskomnadzor's "technical means of
countering threats" (TSPUs – see below), that smaller, local internet
providers may be blocking access or having technical problems, or in the
case of sites hosted abroad, the websites' servers may be blocking access
requests from Russia (see below).
Forum 18 wrote to Roskomnadzor and its subsidiary, the Main Radio Frequency
Centre, on 25 September, to ask:
- why sites are blocked for the expression of religious opinions, including
on war in general or the war in Ukraine;
- why sites are being blocked without being added to the publicly
searchable registry;
- for clarification of technical details of blocking.
Roskomnadzor Press Service's response of 26 September did not answer Forum
18's questions and asked which sites Forum 18 was referring to.
Self-censorship to try to avoid possible prosecution
Alongside blocking or websites and online materials, individuals can be
prosecuted for what they post online
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
In April 2024, a court fined 87-year-old Archbishop Viktor Pivovarov of a
small independent Orthodox community for condemning Russia's invasion of
Ukraine (https://www.forum18.org/archi
conduct of the war in his sermons, articles and video interviews posted
online.
Such cases have led individuals to self-censorship and the removal of
material from the internet to try to avoid possible prosecution.
Portal Credo, a religious news website, went offline of its own accord
after receiving a warning from Roskomnadzor
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
apparently for its coverage of the war in Ukraine. "It remains unclear how
it is technically possible to bring the content of the Portal in line with
the requirements of [the law on disseminating 'false information']," editor
Aleksandr Soldatov wrote on Facebook on 23 March 2022.
After being denounced by a reader and fined under Administrative Code
Article 20.3.3 (https://www.forum18.org/archi
1 for "discrediting" the Russian Armed Forces, Orthodox commentator and
former deacon Andrey Kurayev deleted all posts on his LiveJournal blog
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
February to 1 April 2022, "to make it difficult for future informers to do
their noble work".
Similarly, Fr Nikandr Pinchuk (the first person to receive a criminal
conviction – in his case a large fine - for opposing the war in Ukraine
on religious grounds) deleted his profile on the VKontakte social media
site (https://www.forum18.org/archi
of his initial (administrative) prosecution for calling the Russian army
"the horde of the Antichrist".
Baptist preacher Sergey Stepanov deleted his VKontakte profile "immediately
after the 'law' persecuting people for anti-war statements came into
force", he told a local news website on 30 April 2022, "because I have a
firm anti-war position, which I do not hesitate to express openly". He was
nevertheless still prosecuted and fined
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Article 20.3.3 (https://www.forum18.org/archi
1 for anti-war statements he had made on the page before 4 March 2022, when
the law was adopted.
Sharing blocked material could risk prosecution
While there is no explicit ban on sharing links to or quoting material from
blocked websites, doing so may still incur penalties, depending on the
reason a site was blocked in the first place, the Centre for the Protection
of Media Rights warned in its blog on 5 September 2023
(https://mmdc.ru/blog/2023/09/
If a publication or internet user quotes from the blocked site of an
"undesirable organisation"
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
may be prosecuted for "participation in the activities of an undesirable
organisation" (Administrative Code Article 20.33). Linking to a site
belonging to an "extremist organisation", or citing its materials, could
lead to administrative or even criminal prosecution under the Extremism
Law.
Long history of internet censorship
According to Freedom House's 2023 Freedom on the Net report
(https://freedomhouse.org/coun
badly on: blocking and filtering internet content, "particularly material
that is protected by international human rights standards"; using "legal,
administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or
digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is
protected by international human rights standards"; and "restrictions on
the internet and digital content [which] lack transparency, proportionality
to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process".
Religious material which does not violate the human rights of others has
been routinely blocked over the last ten years, and added to Roskomnadzor's
registry of blocked sites alongside violent terrorist and extremist
content, child pornography, and information on illegal narcotics
production.
Blocking accelerated after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of
Ukraine. Between February 2022 and August 2024, Roskomnadzor blocked over
20,000 websites and webpages
(https://roskomsvoboda.org/ru/
disseminating "false information" about the Russian Armed Forces. These
include the sites of religious organisations and news outlets and the
social media profiles of individual believers who have opposed Russia's war
in Ukraine on religious grounds.
Laws on prohibited internet content have become ever more restrictive in
recent years, and Roskomnadzor's blocking efficiency appears to be
increasing (see below).
"Now the authorities block according to 'black lists', that is, everything
is allowed except what is prohibited. But I see preparations for transition
to a 'white list', when everything is prohibited except what is permitted",
Mikhail Klimarev of the Society for the Defence of the Internet commented
to the independent media project Okno on 15 March 2024
(https://okno.group/blokirovki
"Over 10 years of censorship, Roskomnadzor has blocked millions of websites
and individual materials. In the first half of 2023 alone, the agency
restricted access to 885 thousand websites", Klimarev observed.
"Previously, it seemed that [Roskomnadzor] would only hunt for opposition
media. But in 2024, they are coming for everyone".
Who blocks websites and webpages?
The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information
Technologies, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) is the Russian government
agency with primary responsibility for monitoring the Russian internet and
online communications (as well as offline media). It initiates the blocking
of websites and specific webpages according to its own decisions, court
rulings, and requests from certain other government bodies.
The General Prosecutor's Office, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Service
for Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor), The
Federal Service for Oversight in Healthcare (Roszdravnadzor), Federal
Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Oversight, the Federal Drug
Control Service (before this was subsumed into the Interior Ministry), the
Ministry of Digital Development, the Federal Service for Alcohol Market
Regulation, the Federal Tax Service, and the Federal Agency for Youth
Affairs (Rosmolodezh) are entitled to demand the blocking of particular
categories of online material without any court order.
For example, on the basis of 2014 amendments to the Federal Law on
Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information,
the General Prosecutor's Office can demand the blocking of websites which
contain "calls for mass disorder, extremist activities, incitement of
interethnic and/or interfaith hatred, participation in terrorist
activities".
Regional courts consider blocking requests from other state agencies and
lower-level prosecutor's offices. Private individuals can also submit
online requests for Roskomnadzor to consider particular websites for
blocking.
The Federal Security Service (FSB), meanwhile, has the right to make
blocking demands directly to domain registrars, thus bypassing both the
courts and Roskomnadzor.
Roskomnadzor maintains the "Unified Registry of Domain Names, URLs, and
Network Addresses which allow the identification of information banned from
distribution in the Russian Federation", to which it adds the sites and
webpages government agencies and courts have decided should be blocked.
Russian internet service providers are obliged to monitor the registry and
block their customers' access to all these links.
The registry has existed since 2012 but was not initially accessible to the
public. Originally, it listed websites blocked for content including child
pornography, illegal gambling, suicide methods, and illegal narcotics
sales. This has since been expanded – on the basis of various
increasingly restrictive laws – to incorporate more and more categories
of information deemed to threaten the security and stability of the Russian
state.
Most recently, these have included "false information" about the Russian
Armed Forces (a broad category which covers virtually anything about
Russia's war in Ukraine which contradicts official sources) and "propaganda
of non-traditional sexual relations".
It is not possible to view the full registry on Roskomnadzor's website,
only to search it for specific domain names or website addresses, which
must be precisely entered. Internet freedoms monitoring group Roskomsvoboda
maintains its own mirror of the registry which permits a broader range of
searches.
From November 2022, Roskomnadzor has entered many sites in the registry
with the label "State agency not given" ("Gosorgan ne ukazan").
Roskomsvoboda believes these blocks to have been requested by the General
Prosecutor's Office, which has since largely disappeared from the registry
as a block-requesting agency. Some sites appear in the registry without
even the "State agency not given" designation, Forum 18 has observed.
"Concealing the body that makes the decision to block a resource leads to a
decrease in transparency", Artyom Kozlyuk, head of Roskomsvboda, noted in
comments to Forbes Russia on 5 January 2024
(https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnol
"There is no one [from whom] to request information about what demands were
made on the resource [and] why it was blocked, and it is difficult to
challenge the blocking".
In June 2023, the Justice Ministry also began appearing in the registry as
an agency requesting blocks on websites, even though nothing in the
legislation explicitly allows it to do so without a court order, Freedom
House noted in its 2023 Freedom on the Net report on Russia
(https://freedomhouse.org/coun
appears to have been confined to blocks on websites associated with
so-called "foreign agents".
In addition to internet service providers/telecoms operators, Russian
social media and other tech companies must also cooperate with
Roskomnadzor. Since February 2021, if a user complains about "prohibited
content" (a definition which covers illegal gambling, child pornography,
illicit drug sales, etc., but also material deemed to disrespect society or
the state), the social network must block this immediately, pending review
by Roskomnadzor. Social networks must also block users' profiles if ordered
to do so by Roskomnadzor or the General Prosecutor's Office.
A July 2023 report by the University of Toronto's CitizenLab concluded that
the number of such orders blocking VKontakte pages had risen by 3,000 per
cent since the start of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine.
Since 2020, VKontakte has also used an algorithm to detect images included
in the Justice Ministry's Federal List of Extremist Materials
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
automatically from users' posts, Freedom House noted in its report. The
Russian search engine Yandex has also confirmed that it removes links to
blocked materials from its search results as soon as they are added to the
Unified Registry.
Beyond the concrete actions of Roskomnadzor and other state agencies, it is
clear that Russia's adoption of increasingly repressive laws (on extremism,
on "foreign agents" and "undesirable organisations", on "discreditation" of
and "false information" about the Armed Forces) is leading to a degree of
self-censorship, including among religious websites and individual
believers. The laws' "vague wording" and "arbitrary enforcement" and the
"general ineffectiveness of judicial remedies" also contribute to this,
according to Freedom House
(https://freedomhouse.org/coun
Why are websites blocked?
There are "few clear legal criteria" by which courts and government
agencies, including Roskomnadzor, decide whether or not internet content is
lawful, Freedom House notes in its 2023 report
(https://freedomhouse.org/coun
authorities usually give no detailed explanations.
The blocking of websites is largely governed by the Federal Law "On
Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection"
(https://www.consultant.ru/doc
grounds for restricting access to internet resources. These include the
presence of information relating to child pornography, illegal drugs,
gambling, illegal alcohol sales, the unlicensed sale of restricted
medications, the manufacture of explosives, and the confidential details of
victims and witnesses of crime – but also (non-exhaustively):
- "information expressed in an indecent form, which offends human dignity
and public morality, [or shows] obvious disrespect for society, the state,
official state symbols of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the
Russian Federation or bodies exercising state power in the Russian
Federation";
- "information containing calls for mass disorder, extremist activities,
participation in mass (public) events held in violation of established
procedures";
- "false information disseminated under the guise of reliable reports" on
the use of the Armed Forces (added in July 2022);
- "information containing an offer to finance the enemy in the context of
an armed conflict, military actions, counter-terrorist operations or other
actions involving the use of weapons and military equipment in which the
Russian Federation is participating, as well as information on possible
methods of implementing such financing";
- calls for sanctions against Russia (added in July 2022);
- "information containing a rationale and/or justification for the
implementation of extremist activity, including terrorist activity" (added
in December 2021);
- information "promoting non-traditional sexual relations and/or
preferences" and gender reassignment (these are placed in the same category
as paedophilia) (added in December 2022);
- "information that offends human dignity and public morality, expresses
obvious disrespect for society, contains images of actions with signs of
illegality, including violence, and is disseminated out of hooliganism,
selfishness or other base motives";
- informational materials of an "undesirable", extremist, or terrorist
organisation (added in December 2021);
- information on the collection of donations in connection with the
performance by centralised religious organisations, and by religious
organisations included in their structure, of religious rites and
ceremonies in violation of the requirements of [the Religion Law];
(Materials in all of these categories may be blocked extrajudicially.)
- an administrative conviction for violating the "foreign agent" law (ie.
for failing to label a webpage or blog post with the obligatory "foreign
agent" disclaimer);
- a court decision stating that a site contains information banned from
distribution in the Russian Federation.
Several of these categories, including court orders (usually for
already-banned "extremist" content), information about "extremist"
organisations, and most recently, "false information" about the Russian
Armed Forces, have been used to block religious materials. The precise
grounds for many blocks, however, remain unclear.
Although some "military censorship" blocks (ie. of anything criticising the
war, often even if it does not mention the armed forces) are the result of
court orders, most are requested by the General Prosecutor's Office, as
these do not need to go to court, the Open Observatory of Network
Interference (OONI) pointed out in a February 2023 report
(https://ooni.org/post/2023-ru
OONI also notes that Roskomnadzor blocked more than 6,000 websites in the
first nine months following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 on the basis of a single decision taken by the General
Prosecutor's Office before the "military censorship" laws were even
enacted.
How are websites blocked?
Roskomnadzor's subsidiary, the Main Radio Frequency Centre (Glavniy
Radiochastotniy Tsentr, GRChTs), carries out active surveillance of online
content for prohibited information – this is increasingly an automated
process, and in recent years has begun to incorporate artificial
intelligence.
According to leaked documents from Roskomnadzor's Bashkortostan branch,
reported on by the New York Times in September 2022
(https://www.nytimes.com/inter
the Main Radio Frequency Centre analyses text, images, and video on
websites, social media, and messaging services to identify individuals with
critical views, track the likelihood of protests, and find material which
should be blocked.
Belarusian hacking group Cyberpartisans leaked more Roskomnadzor documents
in November 2022
(https://www.rferl.org/a/russi
which showed that GRChTs also uses bots to enter closed groups and chats.
In February 2023, GRChTs launched a system called "Oculus", which, Radio
Liberty notes, "can allegedly identify information in images or videos that
violates Russian law". Also in 2023, Roskomnadzor announced a tender for
the integration of Oculus with its various other monitoring systems,
Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on 10 April 2024
(https://www.kommersant.ru/doc
the "information system for monitoring internet resources" – which
identifies and categorises texts containing prohibited information.
Roskomnadzor also intended to start using artificial intelligence in 2024,
to improve its analysis of online texts and speed up the identification of
prohibited content, Kommersant added. "In 2023, Roskomnadzor detected
illegal content on the Internet three hours after publication", Kommersant
noted. "In 2024, the figure is planned to be reduced to two hours, and by
the end of 2026 - to one".
Russia's security agencies also carry out monitoring of internet activity.
To obtain an operating licence, an internet service provider must install
equipment which enables this (known as the System for Operational
Investigative Measures, Sistema operativno-rozysknykh meropriyatiy –
SORM). In May 2023, the Ministry of Digital Development had fines
introduced for operators who fail to install SORM, as well as an obligation
for operators to obtain FSB approval before they can apply for a licence
from Roskomnadzor. Telecoms operators must work with the FSB to implement
SORM within 6 months of gaining a licence.
Legal and bureaucratic procedures
Roskomnadzor adds domain names, websites, and webpages to its Unified
Registry based on a) orders from government agencies and the General
Prosecutor's Office (see above); b) court orders; c) its own decisions.
(Private individuals can report internet content they believe to be
unlawful through the Roskomnadzor website. Roskomnadzor sends these reports
on to the relevant government agency, which then communicates its decision
to Roskomnadzor.)
Russian internet service providers automatically download updates to the
Roskomnadzor registry every 2-3 hours and the complete list once a day.
They must then use their own filtering systems to block access to
everything in the registry.
Access to users in Russia is sometimes restricted not just by Roskomnadzor
and the telecoms operators, but also by hosting services and social media
companies at Roskomnadzor's request – for example, the VKontakte social
network will prevent Russian users from seeing a blocked profile, although
the account itself still exists and its contents remain visible from
abroad.
Roskomnadzor should contact a website's hosting provider with a demand to
contact the site owner immediately, and have them remove the material which
has been deemed to violate Russian law within 24 hours. They must then
notify Roskomnadzor that this has been done. If the hosting provider does
not do this, the site is added to the registry and blocked. If hosting
providers and site owners can show that they have removed the material,
Roskomnadzor will allow access to resume.
In practice, however, some organisations find that their websites have been
blocked without any notification from Roskomnadzor.
Site owners are not involved in extrajudicial decisions to block websites
(and are often not involved in court cases). While they may subsequently go
to court to challenge a block within three months, this can be a lengthy
and potentially expensive process.
"It is quite possible to overturn blockings based on a court decision",
Yekaterina Abashina, lawyer at DBA and Partners in Moscow, commented to
Kommersant on 27 March 2024 (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc
the same time, it is much more difficult to achieve the cancellation of a
decision by a state body. In such cases, the courts deem compliance with
the procedure for making a blocking decision to be the most important
thing, and [the procedure] is almost always followed. At the same time, the
nature of the content and the fairness of its classification as prohibited
information are very rarely assessed".
Technical means
After Roskomnadzor has added a website to the Unified Registry, internet
service providers/telecoms operators must then block it using their own
systems for filtering internet traffic. The Open Observatory of Network
Interference (OONI) found that operators use a number of different
techniques (https://ooni.org/post/2023-ru
including tls.connection_reset, tls.generic_timeout_error,
tls.certificate_error, dns.dns_temporary_failure, tcp.connection_refused.
OONI also noted that blocks ordered through the registry are not always put
into practice on all networks.
On 1 November 2019, the so-called "sovereign Runet" law came into force.
This is a set of amendments to the Federal Law on Information aimed at
"suppressing the dissemination of unreliable socially significant
information under the guise of reliable messages that creates a threat of
harm to the life and/or health of citizens [or to] property, a threat of
massive disruption of public order and/or public safety, or a threat of
interfering with the functioning [of critical infrastructure]", according
to a Kremlin statement of 18 March 2019.
As well as creating domestic equivalents to international internet
infrastructure – for example, a Russian domain name system (DNS) as an
alternative to the global domain name system – these amendments oblige
telecoms operators to install state-provided equipment at key internet
nodes, both within and at the borders of the country, enabling Roskomnadzor
both to block information it deems a threat to the state, and to isolate
the Russian segment of the internet (the "Runet") from the rest of the
world wide web in the event of "external threats".
Creation of the "sovereign Runet" has included the installation of
"technical means of countering threats" (tekhnicheskiye sredstva
protivodeystviya ugroza, TSPUs), allowing Roskomnadzor to monitor and
filter internet traffic and block apps and websites unilaterally, no longer
having to rely on individual internet service providers to implement
restrictions (although this still takes place on a large scale), and
without adding these sites to the Unified Registry.
In October 2023, Roskomnadzor director Andrey Lipov said that mobile,
broadband, and cross-border communication nodes in Russia were now "100%
closed with the help of TSPUs", Forbes.ru noted on 9 September 2024
(https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnol
With the introduction of TSPUs, website blocking has become "increasingly
opaque and unpredictable, and, to put it mildly, very dubious even from the
point of view of the legal norms that regulate the blocking of sites",
according to Roskomsvoboda
(https://roskomsvoboda.org/en/
is impossible to trace by what decision and on what grounds these blockings
and slowdowns occur through the TSPU. And this, let us recall, affects our
constitutional rights to access and disseminate information."
A TSPU consists of a set of hardware and software through which internet
service providers are obliged to route all internet traffic, which analyses
this traffic and directly blocks prohibited materials. It can also slow
down access to certain sites – for example, Twitter in 2021 and YouTube
in 2024 – block VPNs, and implement local-level shutdowns (as happened in
Dagestan after rioters attacked a passenger plane from Israel in October
2023).
Roskomnadzor's Centre for Monitoring and Control of the Public
Communications Network (CMU SSOP) installs this equipment on telecoms
operators' premises and is responsible for all subsequent management; the
operators have no access to it and cannot override any blocks. TSPUs are
known as 'black boxes' because telecoms companies themselves "do not know
what Roskomnadzor does with the traffic on their networks", Forbes.ru noted
(https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnol
Although the blocking of internet resources without including them in the
registry does not appear to take place on en masse, "there are and have
been precedents", Artyom Kozlyuk of Roskomsvoboda told Forum 18 on 9
September.
For example, there appears to have been a surge in non-public blocking of
websites in the lead-up to the Russian presidential elections in March
2024, Radio Liberty noted on 15 March
(https://www.svoboda.org/a/ros
when Roskomnadzor stopped updating the Unified Registry entirely. This
hiatus lasted a few weeks, Kozlyuk told Forum 18.
It is not clear how exactly TSPUs work. In contrast to the registry-based
blocks which internet service providers implement, which identify banned
sites by IP address or URL, TSPUs are known to analyse the content of
internet traffic
(https://www.digitalguardian.c
using Deep Packet Inspection technology. They identify sites to block by
means of "signatures", or patterns in data, Kozlyuk of Roskomsvoboda
explained to Forum 18. It is unclear whether Roskomnadzor's systems for
analysing text and images are integrated with TSPUs. (END)
More reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Russia
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
For background information see Forum 18's Russia religious freedom survey
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
Forum 18's compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments
(https://www.forum18.org/archi
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